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This paper examines the Integrated Area Development Approach (IAD) and its potential as a mechanism for influencing Local Government Units (LGUs) to address national constitutional levels, and as a tool for reducing sub-national disparities in welfare through intergovernmental transfers of financial resources. A major finding of this tudy is that the IAD strategy continues to be a valid approach for achieving the redistribution and equity objectives of innational government. However, institutional capacity-building efforts must be exerted, and more efficient intergovernmental resource transfer mechanisms must be put in place if IABLe have to assume the planning and implementation of IAD projects.

1. Introduction

The 1991 Local Government Code (LGC) devolves substantial powers and service responsibilities to the local government units (LGUs), as well as expanditheir financial resources. At the same time, the adoption of the LGC has led to considerable reduction of national government spending for local governments. Indeed, the fiscal relationships envisioned in the LGC presume that local governments would meet most expenditures for local services mainly with their own resources, including their larger share of national revenues through the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA).

Devolution, however, could also lead to the circumvention of the central government's role in redistributing resources, as well as in addressing national concerns of high priority. Especially since local executives, for political and other reasons, tend to be conservative in generating new tax revenues for development programs and projects (see U.P. PLANADES 1993), local investment activities often neglect certain national and sectoral priorities and targets. Indeed, there are differences in developmental priorities between the national government and LGUs. As observed elsewhere, projects with environmental objectives and those with high social benefits but low recovery rates are not expected to draw strong support from LGUs (Gonzales, 1996).

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For this reason, there is near consensus among scholars and policymakers like on the need for national intervention to include financing support for certain development programs other than the provision of the IRA. There is, however, less consensus on the mechanisms for such intervention with a view towards affuencing local investment activities towards national and sectoral priorities, as well as towards ensuring minimum service standards across the country.

This paper briefly looks at the IAD approach and its potential as a mechanism for influencing LGUs to address national concerns at local levels, and as a sol for reducing sub-national disparities in welfare through intergovernmental mansfers of financial resources. Attention will be given to the sharing of responsibilities between the national and local governments in terms of the planning, ackaging, negotiation and implementation of IAD projects. In particular, the hanging management and implementing structures for IAD projects that have volved through the years will be briefly documented. The final section of the aper presents some suggestions for the delivery and financing of IAD projects in he context of devolution and the LGC.

2. Rationale and Central Features

The IAD approach to development started as a movement within the United Nations system, and was conceived as a departure from the conventional macro-conomic approaches to development. Although successful in achieving economic rowth objectives, such conventional approaches have been criticized for their failure in attaining social equity goals. The IAD strategy had been envisioned to didress more directly such equity objectives by giving high priority to the development of less endowed regions in the country.

The main objectives of the IAD approach are to: (1) accelerate economic rowth in depressed areas; (2) increase local participation in the planning and lecision-making processes; and (3) distribute economic gains equitably. To help achieve these objectives, IAD projects had been envisioned to have the following leatures (see Limcaoco, 1984: 17-20):

a. Defined geographic unit. The IAD approach is implemented within a sub-regional delineation and could be multi-provincial or multi-municipal in coverage. Beyond political boundaries, IADs could be delineated on the basis of ecological units (e.g., river basin, watershed, coastal zone, island, etc.) to synchronize politico-economic administration with resource-based environmental, ecosystem management. Such a delineation is functional from the perspective of planning, production, and protection of environmental resources. It is also significant

in that the delineations could define the geographic limits of exter-nalities, as well as appropriate areas for cost-sharing arrangements. In more recent years, how ever, political boundaries more than ecological units had been conveniently used in the delineation of IADs, a pattern that can be attributed to expediency, the increased autonomy of LGUs, and the absence of administrative machinery that governs ecological units.

- b. *Multi-sectoral in operation*. Within an IAD, the project activities of the different government agencies, with focus on various sectors (e.g., infrastructural agriculture, health, etc.), are coordinated to produce complementary and reinforcing effects to the beneficiaries. The assumption that guides this operation is the fact that the problems of rural poverty and unemployment are complex and multi-dimensional in character. A total systems approach is thus adopted in a defined geographic space where development projects are integrated and packaged for greater impact, i.e., the net collective benefits from the package is greater than those of the individual projects.
- c. Spatial integration. IAD boundaries are drawn to effectively link rural production areas with market towns and urban centers. This feature of IAD areas is expected to provide greater access to product and factor markets which would induce farmers to produce beyond subsistence levels, and thus stimulate higher levels of farm production. Indeed, the reason for adopting the "Integrated Area Development" instead of the "Integrated Rural Development" nomenclature is to stress the fact that IAD areas connote the integration of both urban and rural areas. Spatial integration supports the hypothesis that economic development of curs in a specific locational matrix which is primarily rural-industrial in composition.
- d. Grassroots participation. IAD projects aim to generate active participation of the target communities in the planning and implementation of development programs. The participatory approach is expected to achieve a better match between programs and projects on one hand, and grassroots needs and aspiration on the other. The implementation of the projects is also viewed as a shared responsibility by the government and the local people. At the same time, IAD aims to link the poorer segments of society with the rest of the community by providing channels for participation in the production and social processes.
- e. Organizational integration. Since IAD projects are multi-sectoral in operation, they often require an organization that has the coordinative authority and jurisdiction over the activities and resources of a multi-sectoral effort. In the past, this organization had taken the form of a lead agency (an NGA), or a Program/Project Management Office (PMO) set-up. At the national level, every IAD

roject was coordinated by a Cabinet Coordinator who was a member of the Naonal Council for Integrated Area Development (NACIAD) chaired then by the rime Minister.

3. Delivery and Provision: Changing Structures and Processes

Although IAD projects have common features, there is no set blueprint for heir management and implementation. Past projects have differed in terms of anagement structure—from a highly centralized system of project planning and entification in the early seventies to the devolved pattern of project packaging blowing the approval of the LGC. IAD projects have also differed in terms of oundaries—from an early emphasis on the delineation of ecological units (e.g., ver basin, watershed areas, etc.) to the more convenient reliance on political oundaries in recent years. The pattern has also changed somewhat in terms of ectoral and substantive focus—from a major preoccupation with infrastructure evelopment to some degree of concern for the achievement of institutional development objectives. For most IAD projects, the emphasis on infrastructure development (often comprising 70-80 percent of project cost) was based on the assumption hat high investments in infrastructure, particularly in rural areas, were needed out the agricultural production.

The evolution of IAD projects and the changes that have characterized heir planning management and operation may be documented in terms of four 1) major periods: (1) the Pre-1978 period which antedates the National Council for ntegrated Area Development (NACIAD), and may be described as the phase when he IAD concept was formed; (2) the 1978-1988 period which may be referred to as he "NACIAD years," characterized by the creation of NACIAD as the central upervising agency and the full institutionalization of the IAD concept; (3) 1988-991 which is the Post-NACIAD period marked by the taking over by the National conomic Development Authority (NEDA) of NACIAD functions and the strengthning of the NRO-RDC structure; and (4) the Post-1991 period, or the period of lecentralization and local government autonomy.

Appendix A presents a list of IAD projects, categorized in terms of the four 4) major periods, along with a brief description of the area coverage, sectoral omponents, and funding arrangements for the projects. By major period, the main features of the projects will be described in greater detail in the sections that follow. In the process, the sharing of responsibility between the national and local overnments in the planning and implementation of the IAD projects, as well as the management systems and processes that were prominent during each period,

will be documented. A summary of such management systems and processes, we well as the participation of the national and local governments in IAD projects, to presented in Table 1.

A major theme that has surfaced in the analysis may be usefully high lighted. As can be discerned from Table 1, the planning, implementation, and management of IAD projects had gradually shifted from the national government to LGUs. In the early 1970's and during the NACIAD period, IAD projects were nationally initiated, planned, and implemented by NGAs in nationally determined IAD sites. Following the abolition of the NACIAD, the initiative for IAD projects shifted to the RDC-NRO structure, but with substantial participation of LGUs through the membership of local officials in the RDC and project management boards. In the post 1991 period, local governments have taken the initiative for IAD projects which underscores the need for fund transfer mechanisms and local institutional build-up.

Before 1978: Pre-NACIAD

This period (before 1978) antedates the creation of the NACIAD and was marked by the early formation of the IAD concept. During the period, there were no clear prioritization criteria (in terms of specific indicators) for the selection of IAD sites. In broad terms, however, project documents during the period made reference to two major considerations: (1) IAD sites should be "depressed;" and (1) they should have untapped potentials for growth. The four IAD projects that were initiated during the period—the Mindoro Integrated Rural Development Project (MIRDP), the Bicol River Basin Development Project (BRBDP), the Zamboan IAD (Phase 1), and the Cagayan IAD—were supposed to have satisfied the two criteria. It should be noted that as the time frame of these projects extended by yond 1978 (the year NACIAD was created), they were eventually placed under the supervision of NACIAD.

The planning, packaging, and implementation of IAD projects during the period were highly centralized with little or no consultation with local government units (LGUs). It featured the "lead agency" concept where a national government agency (NGA) spearheaded the project. In the case of the MIRDP, for instance which had a primary focus on irrigation, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) served as the lead agency and was primarily responsible for the packaging and negotiation of the project. For the projects during the period, a cabinet-level coordinating council was formed at the national level (composed of the heads of the lead agency and the other participating sectoral agencies) to provide policy guidance and coordination of various project activities.

Table 1 - NG-LGU Participation in IAD Projects

		Period of Initiation	nitiation	
Function/ Processes	Pre-NACIAD (Before 1978)	NACIAD Years (1978-1988)	Post-NACIAD (1988-1991)	Post-LGC (1991-present)
1. Planning/ Packaging	NG through lead agency and parti- cipating NGAs.	NG through NACIAD with barrangay consultations. Local council "adopts" plan document.	NG through RDC- NRO structure with substantial LGU participation through RDC, and project ma- nagement boards.	LGU through provincial go- vernment.
2. Management	NG through lead PMU and project manager; PMU had no budgetary control over par- ticipating NGAs.	NG through IADPOs under NACIAD; IADPOs had no bud- getary control over participating NGAs.	Both NG and LGU, through PMOs under RDC. PMOs had bud- getary control over participating NGAs and LGUs.	Foreign loans negotiatied by LGU with NG assistance, and with LGU counterpart.

Table 1 (continued)

		Period of Initiation	nitiation	
Functions/ Processes	Pre-NACIAD (Before 1978)	NACIAD Years (1978-1988)	Post-NACIAD (1988-1991)	Post-LGC (1991-present)
3. Implementation	NG through lead agency and par- ticipating NGAs.	NG through IADPOs and participating NGAs.	NG (through participating NGAs) and LGUs.	LGU through provincial go- vernment ag- encies.
4. Financing	Foreign loans negotiated by NG (through lead agency) with NG counterpart.	Foreign loans negotiated by NG through NACIAD with NG counterpart.	Foreign loans negotiated by NG (through NEDA) with NG and LGU counterpart.	Foreign loans negotiated by LGU with NG assistance, and with LGU counterpart.
Abbreviations:	NG - National Government NGAs - National Government Agency PMU - Project Management Unit IADPO - IAD Project Office	gency	PMO - Project Management Office NRO - NEDA Regional Office RDC - Regional Development Council	office Council

Funding for the projects were likewise negotiated by the lead agency conerned with international institutions in the form of loans, grants or aids, with ounterparts from the Philippine government.

At the field level, the lead agency seconded a project manager to a Project Management Unit (PMU) which served as the coordinating mechanism for the aputs of the participating NGAs. These PMUs generally functioned independently and had little linkage with the participating LGUs. In general, therefore, the GUs had little or no participation in the planning, negotiation, and implementation of the projects. IAD projects during this period were not "local" projects. They were identified, packaged and negotiated by an NGA and implemented in nationally determined IAD sites. In many ways, IAD projects during this period may have performed a "redistributive" function given the focus on "depressed" areas.

A major drawback of these IAD operations, however, is that the projects arried out were often not consistent with local priorities. Indeed, some LGU offials viewed IAD projects as impositions from "above." More importantly, IAD perations contributed little to the development of management capability among ocal institutions in the absence of horizontal linkages between PMUs and LGUs. The lack of such linkages may have, in fact, retarded the process of technology ransfer and local institutional build-up in the project sites.

A second drawback of the management structure is that the lead agency, oth at the national and field levels, did not have sufficient "clout" over the particienting NGAs, being just one of many equals. This problem is exacerbated by the mad agency's lack of budgetary control over participating NGAs. The lead agency and the participating NGAs had their own budgets and were governed by their win internal financial policies and procedures. One problem that emanated from his system is the lack of synchronization of NGA inputs, defeating the very essence of the IAD approach.

1978-1988: NACIAD Years

Numerous IAD initiatives in the late 1970's created problems of coordination and paved the way towards the creation of the Cabinet Coordinating Committee on Integrated Area Development Project (CCC-IRDP) in 1978. In turn, this led the creation of the National Council on Integrated Area Development (NACIAD) the same year.

During this period, the planning, design and supervision of IAD projects were largely vested in the NACIAD. The Council absorbed the functions of the ICC-IRDP and was specifically empowered "to select rural areas for integrated

development, prepare project studies, arrange and negotiate for funding from local and foreign institutions, and supervise the projects' implementation" (NACIAI) 1987). Clearly the NACIAD exercised a wide array of functions and was at once policymaking body, a planning agency, an "implementing" organization, and a monitoring unit of the national government.

At the field level, IAD projects during this period were governed through network of IAD Project Offices (IADPOs) which usually had an organizationally employed project manager and staff. As shown in Appendix A, there were six (III) IAD initiatives during the period, including the extensions of the Zamboanga IAI) and the BRBDP. Funds for these projects were mainly negotiated by NACIAII with international institutions and made available through loans, grants or aid and with counterpart funds from the Philippine government. The focus on the infrastructure component remained prominent, although many of the project (notably the Aurora and Palawan IADs) included components with social and in stitutional development objectives as well.

The NACIAD structure suffered from basically the same drawbacks as the lead agency set-up. The vast powers of the NACIAD had reinforced the highly centralized operations of the government during the period. Decision-making followed through a layer moving from NACIAD to the IADPOs, bypassing regional and local government authorities. Thus, IAD projects remained largely independent of the LGUs and contributed little to local institutional development. Moreover, like the PMUs in the earlier period, the IADPOs also had little leverage with the field units of the participating NGAs which remained in control of project funds.

It should be noted, however, that while LGUs remained largely as "passive recipients of the benefits of IAD activities, they were provided during this period with some degree of participation in the planning and packaging of the projects Such participation took the form of "Barangay Workshop-Consultations" to provide NACIAD with feedback on the needs and problems of barangay residents. The plan document, which was to serve as the basis for project activities, was likewise presented to the Provincial Development Council for official adoption. Many local officials, however, viewed this participation as "token" since the real decisions on project inputs were made by NACIAD and the participating NGAs.

An improvement that was introduced during this period was the formulation by NACIAD of more explicit criteria for the selection of IAD sites. The application of such criteria basically entailed a four-step process: (1) the stratification of provinces based on a matrix of resource potentials; (2) the ranking of the provinces based on socio-economic indicators; (3) the exclusion of provinces with pipeline and

n-going NACIAD programs; and (4) the clustering, if necessary, of contiguous rovinces with strong functional linkages. The specific indicators used in the deneation of IAD sites are presented in Appendix B.

It should be noted that the criteria and indicators used by NACIAD largely ided to discriminate the so-called "depressed" areas in terms of measures of weller. It has also been noted that, often, "political" considerations seemed to preominate in the choice of the IAD sites.

988-1991: Post-NACIAD

An observation made about NACIAD is that it seemed to duplicate the funcons of NEDA in so far as planning and program formulation are concerned. Indeed, the relationship between the NACIAD and NEDA had been nebulous from the start and duplication of functions did not only lead to redundancy, but also to inhealthy competition as to agency roles and responsibilities. It is for this reason that with the massive political and administrative reforms introduced during the quino government, NACIAD was abolished and its functions were made integral in NEDA.

With the abolition of NACIAD, NEDA played a key role in project planning and packaging through the RDC-NRO structure. As shown in Appendix A, IAD rojects were initiated during this period in three areas: Aurora, Bontoc, and entral Visayas. Through the membership of LGU officials in the RDC, and through the creation of project management boards (composed of both LGU and NEDA fficials), the participation of LGUs in project planning and decision-making had then much more substantial. The greater accessibility of the RDC-NRO structure so enhanced LGU participation.

A major change in the management of the post-NACIAD projects must be oted. Unlike in previous periods, project funds were directly released to the Project lanagement Offices (PMOs) which are integral to the RDC-NRO structure. Having budgetary control over the participating agencies and the LGUs, the PMOs ere able to more effectively coordinate and synchronize project activities.

LGUs also had some participation in financing project activities. Funds for these projects were sourced from international funding institutions (the EC for urora and Bontoc, and the AIDAB for Central Visayas) with counterpart funds om the Philippine government and the LGUs involved. ODA funds have now en exhausted, however, and the Philippine government and the LGUs involved nder a Trilateral Agreement with the international funding institutions) are to

continue the projects using counterpart funds from the Area Development Asset tance Fund (ADAF). The ADAF (which is a budget item in the General Appropriations Act) will cease to exist following completion of the projects.

After 1991: Post-LGC

The devolution of the substantial resources and powers to LGUs under the Local Government Code (LGC) has apparently changed the system of IAD management and operations as shown in the proposed Bukidnon Integrated Area Development Project (BIADP). Although the BIADP was initially conceptualized by the now defunct NACIAD, re-packaging and re-conceptualization of the project concept (following consultations with local officials and various sectors of society were mainly the responsibility of the provincial government which is taking at vantage of an Asian Development Bank subsidy window to finance project activities. As proposed, BIADP would consist of a physical infrastructure development component (farm to market roads, irrigation and other support systems for appropriate and a human resource development component (health and educational facilities, rural water supplies, etc.).

In many ways, the BIADP proposal is a repudiation of the "lead agonor concept and is consistent with the autonomy of LGUs. As envisioned, the provincial government would be fully in charge of project implementation through a fund transfer from the national government to the province. A Project Management Office (PMO) will be created under the direct supervision of the provincial government.

The BIADP experience vividly demonstrates the lack of a fund transfer mechanism from the NG to LGUs. Indeed, the initiative is an example of a project that has been affected by the constraints associated with the MDF transfer mechanism. Because of the small budget of the MDF, the BIADP had been scaled down from the original \$60 million to \$15 million representing the proposed ADF allowation for the project. The small size of the MDF has made it impossible for the DOF BLGF to accommodate the BIADP proposal in full without displacing on-going projects which are themselves competing for meager MDF resources. As such, the BIADP has been reconfigured within the \$15 million limit, and only the roads and infrastructure components of the project will be implemented initially.

Two other reasons have been cited to scale down the BIADP. One, a smaller project will be more manageable as this is the first time for the ADB to assist a purely LGU-initiated investment package. Two, the pending bill to divide Bukidness into two raises the possibility that the new LGU will not be willing to assume the

idebtedness of the project. The project has, therefore, been scaled down and dided into two phases with the loan covering only those municipalities that are kely to be retained in the Province of Bukidnon. For these and other reasons, agotiations have reached an impasse, however, and there are doubts up to this riting as to whether the project will ever be implemented. The delay has also multed in a needless increase in transaction costs.

4. Future Prospects for IAD Projects

Despite aberrations that have characterized the IAD strategy, the validity the approach in fostering improved service delivery of interrelated government rograms in habitually neglected and depressed areas in the country have been cognized. The IAD concept today probably remains a viable and pragmatic open in dealing, in a concerted way, with the multi-dimensional problems of rural overty and unemployment.

In particular, IAD projects could constitute a form of a "national intervenon" that can serve an important purpose. Given their focus on "depressed" areas haracterized by high levels of poverty and unemployment, IAD projects may be seed as mechanisms for achieving the redistributive and equity objectives of the ational government. In this context, the IAD strategy might be considered for so-called "third tier" of LGUs, composed mostly of non-credit worthy fifth and with category of provinces and municipalities which are not logical borrowers ander a market-oriented structure (see Peterson, 1993).

Consistent with the devolution of powers to LGUs, the planning, management and implementation of IAD projects should ideally be lodged with the LGUs. To observed by Gonzalez (1995), the "lead agency" concept must ultimately go note it undermines the grant of more autonomous powers to LGUs. There are, owever, constraints to this ideal set-up as shown in the BIADP experience. Among he more critical constraints are the following:

a. Weak institutional and financial capacities of LGUs. Especially of LGUs interest are the likely targets of IAD interventions, institutional capacities for planing, management, and implementation are also likely to be weak. The same GUs have poor financial positions to shoulder the costs of IAD projects. For this ason, capacity-building of LGUs and intergovernmental resource transfers become urgent concerns if LGUs have to assume the planning and implementation IAD projects.

- b. Lack of LGU "sovereignty." Under the Foreign Borrowers Act, LGU are inhibited from directly contracting with foreign donors. It is, in fact, for the reason that LGUs have to rely on a national government agency (NGA) "padring to take up their cause and include in its budgetary allocation the project initiative. This system often dampens local government initiative and retards the development of the institutional capacities of LGUs. It is for this reason that in the BIADP initiative, the provincial governor has rejected the lead agency concept.
- c. Problems associated with the MDF mechanism. The main transfer mechanism that is currently available to LGUs is the Municipal Development Fund (MDF). As in the case of the BIADP, loan funds are to be conduited through the MDF and subsequently passed on as loan or grant funds to the LGU. Currently however, the MDF is not a large fund and often subjected to budgetary cuts due in large part to DOF budgetary ceilings. This has resulted in credit rationing by the DOF, and only a few LGUs can be accommodated at a time. Nevertheless, many LGUs are willing to join the long queue for subsidized credit. As noted earlier, a consequence of the budgetary ceilings and the small size of the MDF for the BIADI initiative has been a massive down-scaling of the project, from an original coat of about US\$ 60 million to US\$ 15 million. In the view of the provincial governor this defeats the essence of the IAD concept since only the infrastructure component can now be implemented.

In the light of these constraints, what seems feasible for the future? The following are some suggestions on possible institutional and financial arrangements for future IAD projects:

a. Site Selection. In view of the redistributive and equity objectives of IAII projects, the task of site selection and prioritization should be assigned to the national government. Given limited resources, effective redistribution can only be assured if the NG performs this function, and avoid wasteful tax and expenditure competition among LGUs. In this connection, a more definite set of criteria for targeting low-income LGUs for assistance must be developed. Beyond the "class of the LGUs (assistance could be limited to LGUs in the fifth and sixth class) such criteria could also include the revenue-raising performance of the localities involved. In line with the IAD concept, and to ensure the judicious use of national government resources, target areas must encompass two or more contiguous LGUs Preference should be accorded to areas that are delineated on the basis of ecological units (e.g., river basin, watershed, etc.) given the emphasis on projects with environmental objectives. As noted earlier, such a delineation is functional from the perspective of environmental protection.

b. Planning and Packaging. Once selected, the planning and packaging of D projects should be done by the LGU. Planning by the LGU would allow the overnment to cater better to needs and preferences of local residents. It also sings decision-making closer to the people for whom the services are intended hich, in turn, induces greater responsiveness and efficiency in service provision. I view of the weak institutional capability of LGUs (especially those that are kely to be targeted by IAD assistance) technical assistance must be extended to the min the short-term.

The most logical source of such technical assistance is the RDC-NRO structive which has a good familiarity with local development needs and problems, and more accessible to LGUs than Manila-based institutions. As noted in another udy (Astillero, et al., 1993), the RDC-NRO network must, in the context of the GC, reorient its activities from one of essentially fulfilling the requirements of ational level planning to one of responding to the development planning needs of cal government units especially in respect to high impact projects that bear gional significance. Such an reorientation could be achieved through the cretion of component LGU-oriented planning teams within NRO and through the rawing in of expertise from regional educational institutions.

To achieve maximum impact, the choice of IAD projects should be guided by ne following considerations:

- 1. Projects must benefit two or more provinces or municipalities;
- 2. Emphasis should be given to projects that are needed to stimulate economic production; and
- 3. The proposed project should not entail recurrent costs (e.g. maintenance and other operating expenses) to the national government.
- c. Financing. Funds for IAD projects could be in the form of conditional rants and incentives in order to influence local spending towards national priories and concerns. The incentives are "conditional" in the sense that the recipient GU would agree to provide a counterpart and share in the cost of the projects or he provision of the services. The magnitude of the subsidy would depend on the ectors covered by the IAD project.

The funds could be direct NG appropriations, or could be sourced by the NG rom foreign or private institutions and passed on as grant funds to the LGU or GUs involved. The MDF mechanism could be utilized for this purpose. Since

only selected LGUs would be eligible for IAD assistance, and given appropriate prioritization of prospective IAD sites, the queuing and accommodation problem would be minimized. LGU counterparts could take the form of IRA deductions

d. Implementation. For IAD areas that are fully within provincial bound aries, project implementation should be the responsibility of the provincial government, through the Provincial Planning and Development Staff (PPDS) as project coordinator. This would facilitate consistency of level and mix of public services with the preferences of project beneficiaries as well as provides incentives for the efficient delivery of project components.

For projects that cut across provincial boundaries, project management should be lodged with the NRO structure but with full participation of the LGU involved. A project governing board (to be composed of the mayors and provincial governors involved), which shall be the project's policymaking and decision-making body, could be created. In both cases, the provincial planning development staff and the NRO should be given full budgetary control of project funds to ensure quick and synchronized service provision which is critical in the IAD project. In the short-term, the RDC-NRO structure could again be a source of technical assistance for LGUs with weak institutional capabilities. In the long-term, a sustained capacity-building effort for LGU personnel in planning, project development, and financial management must be exerted.

Appendix A. Integrated Area Development Projects and their Components

Period of Initiation					Cost (Cost (in million pesos)	(sosed)	
and Name of Project	Implementation Period	Component	Area Covered	Donor	GOP	Donor	Total	Implementing Agencies
1.0 Pre-NACIAD ((Before 1978)	1.0	g Committee on II	RP, 1975-197	(8)	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,			Ē
1.1 Mindoro IRDP Phase I	1975-1983	1. Roads 2. Irrigation 3. Ports 4. Watershed	Oriental and Occi- dental Mindoro	WB	312.1	195.0	507.1	DPWH NIA DPWH DENR
		Protection 5. Agricultural Support						DAF
		Services 6. Schistoso- miasis						рон
		Control 7. Mangyan Assistance						NMYC/ NACIDA/ DSSD/Prov'l Gov't

	Salvano	Implementing Agencies			4 NIA/DAF			DPWH			DAR				NIA/DPWH/	BFD		NIA/BFD			HOU			1 日の日の日の日の日の日の日の日の日の日の日の日の日の日の日の日の日の日の日の	
	(sosad t	Total			1850.4																				
	Cost (in million pesos)	Donor			871.7																				
	Cost (GOP			978.7										i		III.						are Mary	1	
		Donor			USAID											A								THE REAL PROPERTY.	
		Covered			Camari-	nes Sur,	Albay,	Sorsogon				4.55								7.0.13		L PASSAGE SE	Special Control of the		
		Component			1. Libmanan-	Cabusao IDA	Projects	2. Bicol Secon-	dary & Fee-	der Rds. Proj.	3. Bula-Mina-	labac Land	Consolida-	tion Proj.	4. Bicol River	Basin Irriga-	tion Dev. Proj.	5. Riconada-	Buhi/Lalo	Project	6. Bicol Integra-	ted Health,	Nutrition &	Population	Project (c)
		1mplementation Period			1975-1987																				
Period of	Initiation	and Iname of Project	1.2 Bicol	River Basin	Dev't Prog.																			The State of the S	

Appendix A (continued)

Period of Initiation					Cost (Cost (in million pesos)	(sosed)	
and Name of Project	Implementation Period	Component	Area Covered	Donor	GOP	Donor	Total	Implementing Agencies
1.3 Zambo-	1975-1980	1. Roads and	Zambo.	AIDAB	226.9	228.0	454.9	DPWH
Phase I		2. Irrigation, rural water						NIA
		supply 3. Agricultural development						DAF
1.4 Cagayan	1977-1988	1. Agri'l Pilot	Cagayan	JICA	619.2	224.2	843.6	DAF
IONI		2. Electrifica-	a no vince		000000000000000000000000000000000000000			NEA
		3. Intensified Rice Produc-	***************************************					APC
		tion Program 4. Expanded Yellow Corn) E					APC
		5. Irrigation 6. Barangay Rds.						NIA DPWH

Appendix A (continued)

2 4 5	E	Area		Cost (i)	Cost (in million pesos)	(sosed)	Implementing
Component	nent	Covered	Donor	GOP	Donor	Total	Agencies
5. San Jose	Jose						DPWH
6. Citr	6. Citrus-Based						NSTA/MIRDO/
Proc Proj	Processing Projects						Gov't (Or. Min-
7. Min	7. Mindoro In-	33.1407.1401					doro) NMYC/DPWH/
tegrated	ted	J. 1980. J. 1					NIA/NACIDA/
Train	manpower Training Ctr.						Prov'l Gov't
							(Occ. ivillation)
1. Roads and	and	Samar					DPWH
2. Port		5	WB	1161.7	829.8	2021.6	NIA
3. Water Sup-	Sup-		ATDAR				DPWH
4. Water Sup-	Sup-		drain				DPWH
ply Level II	rel II						
5. Rural Dev't.	Jev't.						DAP/BFAR/ PCA/FIDA/
			77.17.200				DSSD/DECS/
							DOH/UEP/

Twalomonting	Agencies	NIA DOH NSIRDP/PEO/ DDS SIRDPO	NIA/DAF DPWH DAR
pesos)	Total		(1850.4)
Cost (in million pesos)	Donor		USAID (978.7) (871.7) (1850.4)
Cost (i	GOP		(978.7)
	Donor		USAID
	Covered		Camari- nes Sur, Albay, Sorsogon
	Component	6. Irrigation 7. Schistoso- miasis con- trol 8. Local Gov't Support 9. Catubig Val- ley Dev't. Study	1. Libmanan- Cabusao IDA Projects 2. Bicol Secondary & Feeder Rds. Proj. (c) 3. Bula-Minalabac Land Consolidation Proj.
	Implementation Period		1980-1988
Period of Initiation	and Name of Project	2.2 Samar IRD (cont.)	2.3 Bicol River Basin Dev't. Prog. USAID Funded Irrigation Projects

	Agencies	NIA/DPWH/ BFD	NIA/BFD	рон) DPWH	NIA DPWH DAF
pesos)	Total					(454.9	
Cost (in million pesos)	Donor					AIDAB (226.9) (228.0) (454.9)	
Cost (i	GOP					(226.9)	ŝį
	Donor			99 L 70 L 44 W 2007		AIDAB	
V	Covered					Zambo.	
	Component	4. Bicol River Basin Irri- gation Dev't.	5. Riconada- Buhi/Lalo	Froject 6. Bicol Integ- rated Health,	Nutrition & Population Project	1. Roads and	2. Irrigation 3. Water Supply 4. Agricultural development
T.	Implementation Period					1981-1988	
Period of Initiation	of Project	2.3 Bicol River Basin (cont.)				2.4 Zambo-	Phase II

Period of Initiation			,		Cost (Cost (in million pesos)	(sosad ı	.,
and Name of Project	Implementation Period	Component	Area Covered	Donor	GOP	Donor	Total	Implementing Agencies
2.5 Palawan IADP	1982-1989	Agri'l Intensification and Diversification Livestock Dev't. Road Dev't. Dorts Dev't. Drinking Water Supply Communal Irrigation Land Classification Land Survey and Titling	Central and Sou- thern part of Palawan	ADB/ EC	331.4	682.1	1013.5	DAF DAF DPWH DPWH NIA DENR
2.6 Phil. Rural Infra- structure Proj. (PRIP)	1982-1986	Roads Barangay health ctrs. Rural water supply Poers	Abra, Aklan, Antique, Bohol, Capiz,	IDA/ WB	359.6	268.1	627.7	нмас Въмн Въмн

Temlomonting	Agencies	DPWH	DPWH DPWH	DPWH	DAP/BFAR/	DSSD/DECS/	DOH/UEP/ NGOs/NIA	NIA	ПОН		NSIRDP/PEO/	SIRDPO		
pesos)	Total	(1161.7) (859.8) (2021.6)					4100 - 4100 -				Ī			
Cost (in million pesos)	Donor	(82638)												
Cost (i	GOP	(1161.7)												
	Donor	WB	AIDAB											
	Area Covered	Samar	Island											
	Component	1. Roads and	bridges 2. Port 3. Water Sup-	ply Level I 4. Water Sup-	ply Level 5. Rural Dev't.			6. Irrigation	7. Schistoso-	miasis	8. Local Gov't.	support 9. Catubig Val-	ley Dev't.	Study
	Implementation Period	1984-1988												
Period of Initiation	and Name of Project	2.7 Samar	IRDP WB Funded Northern	Samar IRD II										

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Aurora WWC 134.0 137.4 271.4
2. Irrigation

Implementation		Area		Cost	Cost (in million pesos)	n pesos)	
Period	Component	Covered	Donor	GOP	Donor	Total	- Implementing Agencies
	4. Agricultural support 5. Port 6. Health and social services 7. Watershed management					J. 150	DAF DPWH DOH DENR
1990-2000	Roads and bridges Lirigation/flood control Agricultural support Health and social services Vices Watershed management	Bondoc Penin- sula	GTZ	881.0		DM28M	Nat'l Gov't with parti- cipation of RDC/NRO LGU

Appendix A (continued)

Period of Initiation					Cost (Cost (in million pesos)	(sosed)	Imputing
and Name of Project	Implementation Period	Component	Area Covered	Donor	GOP	GOP Donor Total	Total	Agencies
3.2 Central Visayas Wa- ter and Sa- nitation Project	1991-1995	Water supply Lealth and social services	Central Visayas Region	AIDAB			249	Nat'l. Gov't. through NRO/RDC structure
4.0 Post-LGC								
4.1 Bukid- non IADP		1. Pipeline project						Provincial Government

Appendix B. NACIAD Criteria for Selection of Areas for IAD Planning

In line with the basic premises on which NACIAD was established, the methodology for area selection necessarily possesses a bias in favor of depressed areas with high development potential, specifically in their agricultural, fisheries, industrial and human resources.

The province is used as the basic unit of comparison because it is the most feasible and manageable level of aggregative statistical data in the country.

An iterative process consisting of development resources evaluation, socioconomic evaluation and finally inter-regional balancing of IAD project distribution is applied to all provinces of the country. It consists of the following steps:

First Step: Stratification based on resource potentials:

Provinces are stratified into five priority strata based on a matrix of resource potentials. The matrix reflects on its horizontal axis the scale of the resources and on its vertical axis the level of development/utilization of the resources. The indicators used are: arable land area and percent cultivated; palay farms and percent irrigated, fishpond areas and yield per hectare; and population size and arable land density.

Indicators that while desirable could not be used for reasons of lack of comparable data of provincial level include upland potentials, level of investments, and sectoral growth rates.

Indicators that were not used because of their "regional" rather than provincial comparability are forest resources, minerals, and off-shore fisheries.

Provinces falling within the 5th stratum are given the higher priority followed by those in the 4th, 3rd, and 2nd stratum, respectively. Provinces in the 1st stratum are excluded from subsequent ranking.

Second Step: Ranking based on socio-economic indicators

Provinces are scored as to their level of socio-economic development using the following indicators: income, employment, industrial activities, health, education, housing facilities, transport system, and communication facilities. A weighing system is applied to the indicators as follows:

A. Economic (60	0 points)
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1. Per Capita Household Income	20 pts.
(annual income)	

2. Employment Rate, 1975	20 pts.
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3. Level of Industrial Activities	20 pts.
a No of Establishments	

b. percent of Labor Force Employed by Manufacturing

B. Social (40 points)

1. Health Status	10 pts.
a. Morbidity Rate, 1976	
b. Infant Mortality, 1976	
c. percent 3rd Degree Malnutrition among	
Children, 1979	

2. Educational Status	10 pts.
a. Literacy Rate, 1970	
1 4 0 14: 0 1 1	

b. Age 6-14 in School c. Percent Age 15-25 in School

	c. Percent Age 15-25 in School	
3.	Housing Facilities	10 pts.
	a. percent Dwelling Units with Toilets, 1975	
	b. percent Dwelling Units with Potable Water	
	Supply, 1975	
	c. percent Dwelling Units with Electricity	
1	The second street of the second secon	10 nto

4. Transportation/Communication Facilities 10 pts.
a. Km. roads/sq.km. of arable land, 1978
b. percent Households with Radio Sets

- c. Newspaper/1,000 population
- d. No. of telephone/1,000 population
- e. No. of Ports (for Regions VI-XII only)
- f. No. of Commercial and Municipal Fish Landing Ports

Scoring

Data for all provinces are ranged from highest to lowest and the maximum allowed score is given to the highest datum while a score of one point to the lowest datum. The range is then equally divided between score one and the maximum allowable score. Highest possible combined score for all indicators is 100 with a stress ratio of 60 percent for economic and 40 percent for social indicators.

Prioritization for IAD starts with the province with the lowest score. A cut-off point is arbitrarily set at 50 points or 50 percent of maximum possible score. Provinces falling above this point are excluded from the ranking.

Third Step: Exclusion of Programmed Areas

Prior to ranking of program inclusion, the following provinces were first excluded from the list:

- a) areas on-going and pipeline NACIAD programs.
- b) areas programmed for planning in 1981.
- c) areas under active coverage by development authorities on an integrated area or related concept.

Fourth Step: Five-year Program

The remaining provinces are then included in the program. Finally, on the basis of EO 731 expressed policy on multi-provincial, subregional geographical coverage of IAD projects, contiguous provinces with strong functional linkages are combined into one project area.

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